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TWO FACES OF GOVERNANCE IN U.S. FIRMS
account, by contrast, emphasizes the national polity as the source both o f the new image o f workers and o f legalistic models for organi
view that legalization is inherently inclusive and empowering (also see Nonet and Selznick 1978) . But Pfeffer and Baron (1988) 
CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF LEGALIZATION
Efficiency Theory
The conventional rationalist view o f organizations suggests that formalization o f the employment relationship is driven by the logic o f efficiency: Formalized personnel practices reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency by ordering decision-making authority within the firm (Simon 1957) and stabilizing interactions with the environment (March and Simon 1958; Thompson 1967; Williamson 1975 (Doeringer and Piore 197 1 ; Schlichter 1961 ; Williamson 1975) . The most obvious strategy for reducing turnover is to pay high wages (Becker 1964) , but Williamson (1985:256) (Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Bridges and Villemez 1991; Pugh et al. 1969 (Oi 1990) .
Our use o f industry-level variables follows the arguments o f Althauser (1989) and Bridges and Villemez (199 1) . Neoclassical labor economists assume that firm-specific skills influence the formation o f internal governance structures only when external labor markets are unable to assure an adequate supply o f workers with appropriate skills. Althauser (1989) concludes that the empirical literature offers little evidence that firmspecific skills influence governance but strongly supports the influence o f labor scarcity. Bridges and Villemez (1991) (Doeringer and Piore 1971) . The second feature is capital intensity: Because jobs in capital intensive sectors tend to be difficult to disentangle and to monitor, firms in these industries are likely to adopt governance policies to discourage employees from shirking or leaving (Bulow and Sum-mers 1986:387 (Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby 1986:261) , thus they more often have access to dueprocess governance structures (Bridges and Villemez 1991 (Braverman 1974; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980; Edwards 1979 (Edwards 1979; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Hodson 1978; Tolbert, Horan, and Beck 1980 Edwards (1979:21) 
THE NEOINSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT
Early formulations of neoinstitutional theory sought to explain organizational conformity with highly institutionalized, and therefore broadly legitimate, models of structure and practice (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) . This approach has been useful in explaining the diffusion of established institutional forms, but has been less successful in accounting for institutional change-an issue that requires greater attention to interest and agency (DiMaggio 1988; Jepperson 1991; Perrow 1985) . The present study offers an opportunity to address this issue. In general terms, neoinstitutional theory suggests that law-like rules of governance appear not as instrumental means to achieve managerial efficiency or to control workers, but rather as symbolic evidence that the firm is attentive to wider norms of equity and justice. But how did legalization achieve institutional status? Our analysis focuses on change in the legal environment, specifically the impact of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action (EEOIAA) law on U.S. employers. In some instances, legal changes may be unambiguous and organizational responses are relatively straightforward (Fligstein 1990 ), but this is rarely the case. Legal changes often carry ambiguous mandates, and standards of compliance are often unspecified (Carruthers and Halliday 1994; Suchman and Edelman 1994) . Under these conditions, organizations do not simply respond to legal change; they help to constitute it. EEOJAA law and collateral legal changes invalidated the most egregiously discriminatory forms of personnel policy, undermined employers' right to hire and fire, and raised uncertainty about the kinds of policies that would henceforth be considered legitimate. By the late 1970s or early 1980s, legalized governance was institutionalized as a legitimate strategy for reducing uncertainty in the legal environment.
To explain this institutionalization process, we build on DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) distinction between "coercive" and "normative" isomorphism among organizations. We agree that the state and the professions are key agents of organizational change, but argue that the DiMaggio and Powell model AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW must be respecified in two ways to account for legalization as a process. First, they describe coercive isomorphism as conformity with presumably clear and authoritative government mandates. We argue that the most important feature of U.S. employment relations law is its ambivalence and ambiguity. Second, their discussion of normative isomorphism tends to assume the existence of established professional groups with relatively secure charters over specific domains of organizational activity. Our analysis emphasizes competition among professions to gain control over the emergent domain of employee governance. Finally, their account implies that the influences of the state and the professions are independent and additive-in some institutional sectors the state is a dominant influence and in others the professions dominate. In our account, their roles are interdependent and mutually constitutive.
We build our hypotheses on a more concrete set of arguments about (1) salient developments in EEOJAA law over the period of our study, and (2) the roles played by personnel and labor-law professionals in the construction of the legal environment.
The Role of the State
The U.S. state has conventionally been viewed as "weak" and incapable of dictating the behavior of private actors, whether they are individuals or firms. Recent studies have revised that image (Hamilton and Sutton 1989) : Government in the United States has had a profound influence on the ordering of civil society, but that influence often works indirectly, through moral suasion and the manipulation of market incentives rather than through direct mandates. As research by Baron and his colleagues has shown (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin 1988) , the U.S. federal government has influenced firm governance in this fashion at least since the 1940s. Our story begins later, with the surge of government interest in equal employment opportunity and affirmative action that began in the mid1960s (Burstein 1985; Kohl 1985) .
We argue that shifts in the posture of the federal government toward enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as key court decisions in some states, influenced the perceived attractiveness of legalization to employers. Title VII by itself was probably not materially responsible for the spread of due-process mechanisms in the workplace. Title VII's nondiscrimination mandate was ambiguous and in important ways was contradicted by the parallel mandate for affirmative action issued to government contractors in Executive Order 11246 (1965) . The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency created to enforce Title VII, had little real enforcement power. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), the agency charged with enforcement of E O 11246, had formidable power to revoke contracts, but failed for several years to develop compliance standards (Edelman 1992; Lempert and Sanders 1986:378-79) .
Pressures for legalization increased after about 1972, when actions by all three branches of government increased the potential for enforcing Title VII and E O 11246. In 1970, the OFCC required federal contractors to file workforce statistics and affirmative action plans, making it possible for the first time to monitor progress in affirmative action. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to give the EEOC authority to bring suit against employers in federal court. In 1971 and 1975 the Supreme Court ruled in the cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Company (401 U.S. 424 [1971] ) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody (422 U.S. 405 [1975) ] that employers were liable for the discriminatory effects of their employment tests, even if discriminatory outcomes were unintended. These decisions applied only to testing procedures, but they raised the specter of a pro-employee shift in the liability standard for employment discrimination cases generally. As a result of these and other changes, the legal environment became more threatening to employers. The number of employment discrimination suits grew sharply after about 1972, and the volume of class-action suits multiplied (Donohue and Siegelman 1991). In addition, the focus of employment discrimination legislation changed from "hiring" cases, involving rejected job applicants, to "firing" cases, involving claims of unjust discharge. The spotlight moved from blatantly segregated workplaces to workplaces that already employed significant numbers of women and minorities, and Title VII became "a sort of implicit tort of wrongful discharge . . . for virtually all workers except white males under the age of 4 0 (Donohue and Siegelman 199 1 :1033) .
After about 1980 the legal environment changed again, but in somewhat contradictory ways. On one hand, the new Reagan Administration quickly put the brakes on civil rights enforcement (Days 1984:313-19) , and enforcement against federal contractors of EEOIAA rules virtually halted (Edelman 1992 (Edelman :1541 .Õn the other hand, a few state courts raised new uncertainties by undermining the traditional common-law doctrine of at-will employment under which employers may discharge workers without cause.-courts in California were particularly aggressive in this regard. In three seminal cases-Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (164 Cal. Rptr. 839 [1980] ), Cleary v. American Airlines (168 Cal Rptr. 722 [1980] ), and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. (171 Cal. Rptr. 917 [1981] )~-California courts broadened employers' liability for wrongful discharge and in some instances required employers to honor their own due-process governance procedures and implied promises of career employment (Jensen 1988) . Note that these were not employment discrimination cases. Indeed, plaintiffs tended to be White males with long records of service and regular promotions. But nonetheless, because they tended to target core-sector employers and raised vexing questions about the legitimate grounds for dismissal, these cases dovetailed with contemporaneous trends in employment-discrimination litigation.
This argument suggests that rates of legalization are time-dependent, with changes corresponding to trends in EEOIAA enforcement and wrongful discharge litigation. Our data cover the period from 1955 to 1985, and We offer two more substan'tive hypotheses about the role of the state in the legalization process, also in time-dependent terms. Federal contractors were first required to submit affirmative action plans to the OFCC in the early 1970s, and inclusive governance policies such as grievance procedures would have provided a simple and attractive means of demonstrating good-faith compliance. OFCC scrutiny offered no encouragement for exclusionary governance policies like EAW clauses, so we suspect that federal contractors were indifferent, or perhaps resistant, to them: H9: Federal contractors show higher-thanaverage adoption rates for grit qance procedures after 1972; their adoption rates for EAW clauses are average or lower than average in all periods.
The legal climate in California probably encouraged the adoption of grievance procedures as well as EAW clauses, but only after 1980: H,,: California employers show higher than average adoption rates for grievance procedures and EAW clauses in the 1981-1985 period, but not before.
The Role of the Professions
While none of the federal or state policies we have reviewed mandated legalized governance, legalization was encouraged by the drift toward a procedural rather than substantive interpretation of EEOIAA law. That is, courts and administrative agencies required employers to use personnel procedures that were demonstrably race-and gender-blind, but they tended not to require race-or gender-neutral outcomes. This procedural interpretation left employers with considerable room to improvise, but also added to their uncertainty as long as the legality of specific personnel practices could only be determined post hoc through litigation. It is at this point that the boundary-spanning activities of professional groups involved in labor recruitment and governance-specifically personnel administrators and labor attorneys-become crucial.
The role of the professions as carriers of managerial ideologies and of legalization policies in particular has been noted for some time (Selznick 1969:9 1; Vollmer and McGillivray 1960 ). Here we draw on a study by Edelman et al. (1992) of the professional literature on wrongful discharge to suggest a more complex pattern of influence. They argue that personnel administrators and labor lawyers sought to establish secure jurisdiction over the domain of employment relations, in part by dramatizing the perils of wrongful discharge law and offering courtproof recipes for compliance. Based on analyses of appellate cases and articles in professional journals, Edelman et al. show that personnel experts and labor lawyers exaggerated the threat of wrongful-discharge litigation and encouraged employers to adopt proactive governance strategies.
We extend the findings of Edelman et al. (1992) in two ways. First, we argue that professionals responded opportunistically, not just to wrongful-discharge law, but also to a much broader range of threats posed by EEO law, affirmative action rules, and the growing case law on sexual harassment. In the early 1970s, several articles in the professional personnel literature urged personnel administrators to use managers' uncertainty over standards of compliance as leverage for upgrading and formalizing the personnel function within firms (Froehlich and Hawver 1974; Garris and Black 1974; Giblin and Ornati 1974) . Literature aimed at personnel administrators, labor attorneys, and managers recommended the adoption of legalistic governance mechanisms-including grievance procedures (Ewing 1982; Gery 1977; Leap, Holley, and Field 1980; Linenberger and Keaveny 1981; Marino 1980; Soutar 1981; Staudohar 1981; Thorp 1973; Westin and Feliu 1988) and employment-at-will clauses (Baskin 1987; Witt and Goldman 1988; Youngblood and Tidwell 1981) -as a strategy to immunize firms against litigation. This suggests that firms in which personnel and legal professionals are influential would be more likely to adopt these innovations.
Second, additional findings from the study by Edelman et al. (1992) suggest that personnel administrators and labor lawyers emphasized different kinds of responses to legal uncertainty. They found that literature aimed at personnel professionals grossly exaggerated the threat of litigation and encouraged preemptive measures-such as EAW clauses-designed to protect the employer's "right to fire." The legal literature was more conservative in its assessment of the legal threat to employers and was more likely to recommend fair treatment-including grievance procedures-as the best preventive strategy (Edelman et al. 1992:68-69) . We argue that both groups promoted grievance procedures, but at different points: the personnel profession has encouraged nonunion grievance procedures for several decades (Selznick 1969; Vollmer and McGillivray 1960) , but the legal profession seems to have weighed in later in response to growing legal uncertainty in the 1970s. More categorical differences are likely to appear in the case of EAW clauses. While Edelman et al. (1992) report that labor attorneys did not actively support EAW clauses, we found evidence that, at least from 1955 through 1985, they were skeptical of the legal value of such clauses (Abbassi, Hollman, and Murrey 1987; Baskin 1987; Condon and Wolff 1985; Steiner and Dabrow 1986; Winters 1985 ). Thus we suspect that although personnel administrators may have promoted EAW clauses, labor attorneys did not.
These arguments suggest that personnel administrators actively supported grievance procedures earlier than did labor attorneys, and that support for EAW clauses came primarily from personnel administrators:
HI,: Firms with personnel offices show higher adoption rates for grievance procedures in all periods and higher adoption rates for EAW clauses after 1972 than do firms lacking personnel offices.
HI2: Firms that retained outside labor attorneys show higher adoption rates for grievance procedures after 1972; among these firms, adoption rates for EAW clauses are average or below average throughout the period of study.
DATA AND MEASURES
Sample and Data Collection
Our sampling and data-collection procedures have been described in earlier papers (Dobbin et al. 1993; Sutton et al. 1994 ). Here we present only the details that are relevant to the present analysis. Data are from a stratified random sample of 154 private, for-profit firms in three states (California, New Jersey, and Virginia) and seven industries (publishing, chemical manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, electrical manufacturing, transportation, retail trade, and banking).4 Data were collected using a survey instrument containing questions about organizational structure and demographics, employment relations policies, and links to other organizations during the period from 1955 to 1985. These data were transformed into annual spells, yielding a data set with an N of 3,608 organization-years. We supplemented this organization-level data set with data on industrial and labor-market conditions (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986; U.S. Department of Labor 1975 -1987 . Wages, benefits, and capital investments are measured at the national level by industry; data on workforce characteristics (employment by race, gender, age, and broad occupational categories) are broken out by industry and by state.
Measures
Dependent variables. Two items on our questionnaire provide outcome variables for the analysis. Employers were asked when, if ever, they first (1) created a formal grievance procedure for nonunion, exempt (salaried) employees, and (2) published an employment-at-will clause in material routinely distributed to employees (including employment applications, employee rule books, orientation materials, or other memos). We analyze our data using event-history techniques (Tuma and Hannan 1984) , and we treat adoption of grievance procedures and EAW clauses as separate events.
These for-profit firms comprise a subsample of the data described in earlier papers. The full sample includes nonprofit organizations and government agencies. Figure 1 shows temporal patterns of adoption in the form of cumulative hazard plots. In event-history terms, the dependent variables-adoption rates-are the continuous slopes of the hazard plots. Comparison of the two plots reveals different patterns of timedependence. Grievance procedures had a foothold among nearly 10 percent of firms in 1965, and by 1985 they had spread to about 30 percent of firms.5 Diffusion occurred at a fairly steady rate-there is no evidence here that adoption rates were higher in the 1970s, as we hypothesized. EAW clauses took off slowly but diffused at an exponentially increasing rate: Fewer than 5 percent of the firms in our sample had published EAW clauses by 1970, and by 1985 they appeared in 29 percent. Thus, while the pace of diffusion differed markedly for the two innovations, by the end of the observation period they had penetrated our sample of firms to about the same degree. Note that while grievance procedures and EAW clauses are not mutually exclusive, they rarely appear together: By 1985, only 11 percent of the firms in our sample had both grievance procedures and EAW clauses, and 52 percent had neither; about 19 percent had grievance procedures but not EAW clauses, and about 18 percent had EAW clauses but not grievance procedures.
---------------
Independent variables. Efficiency hypotheses are operationalized using one firm-level measure-the (log) number of employees, which is an indicator of firm size-and three industry-level measures-the average wage, which is measured as the annual change in the ratio of total wages and salaries to total employees, capital intensity, which is measured as the ratio of total capital consumption allowances to total wages and salaries; and dependence on high-skill, high-status employees, which is measured by the per-'The percentage figures mentioned here do not correspond to the hazard rates shown in Figure 1 , in part because they are calculated using different bases. Percentages include firms that had grievance procedures before 1955 (no firms had EAW clauses at that time), as well as firms that were founded between 1955 and 1985 with either of the two policies in place at the time of founding. Hazard rates and subsequent analyses are calculated using only firms adopting either policy subsequent to founding and during the 1955-1985 period. centage of all workers who fall into the top two tiers of the standard nine-level occupational scale (technical/professional and managerial/administrative employees). We first-difference the wage series to correct for an upward secular trend that appears in all industries represented in our study. Efficiency arguments suggest that all independent variables will be positively associated with the adoption of grievance procedures and EAW clauses.
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Labor-control hypotheses are tested using three measures. To measure the formation of internal labor markets (ILM), we use an additive index that shows whether in any given year the employer used written job descriptions, tests for employment, promotion tests, salary classifications, performance evaluations, job ladders, centralized hiring, or centralized promotion and discharge. The ILM variable should have a positive effect on grievance procedures and a negative effect on EAW clauses. We use annual growth in the percentage female among workers, measured within industries by state, as an indicator of seconday labor markets. As segmentation theorists might predict, our early tests showed that percent female, percent Black, and percent over 65 are all highly intercorrelated. Percent female was most strongly associated with the adoption of grievance procedures, however, and is used here as a proxy for secondary labor market status. As with the wage measure, we have calculated annual changes in percent female employees to control for secular increases across all industries. The segmentation argument suggests that this variable will be negatively associated with grievance procedures and positively associated with EAW clauses. An indicator of unionization, coded 1 for firms with union contracts and 0 for nonunionized firms, permits a test of whether legalization is used by employers to resist unionization. Negative effects of unionization are expected on both outcomes.
Neoinstitutional hypotheses suggest two kinds of effects: main effects of government EEOIAA policy, and interactions between government policy and organization attributes. We think that direct federal pressure accelerated the adoption of grievance procedures in the years 1972 to 1980 and might have led to a decline in adoption rates after 1980. Figure 1 suggests that adoption rates for EAW clauses continued to accelerate through 1985. Our estimation model divides the adoption process into three periods-1955-1972, 1973-1980, and 1981-1985 with period-specific constants denoting shifts in the baseline rates of adoption. Federal contracting, location in California, existence of a personnel office, and association with a labor attorney are coded as binary variables (0,l). In general, we expect that most organization-level effects should appear after 1972 in response to Title VII amendments and the Griggs decision. Federal contracting is expected to have positive effects on grievance procedures and negative effects on EAW clauses; coefficients are likely to show strongest effects in the second period (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , and reduced effects in the third period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , when the threat of aggressive federal enforcement of EEOIAA regulations receded. A positive effect of location in California on both innovations is expected in the third period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , in response to the Tameny, Cleary, and Pugh decisions. Because personnel administrators were early sponsors of grievance procedures, we should find a significant effect of personnel offices in the first period, before the advent of EEO law. We expect a positive effect in the second and third periods as well, but cannot anticipate when the effect was strongest. The effects of labor attorneys on grievance procedures and of personnel administrators on EAW clauses probably appeared only after 1972, but we have no grounds to hypothesize whether those effects were stronger in the second or third periods. We anticipate no effect of labor attorneys on the diffusion of EAW clauses in any period.
Models
Our hypotheses suggest three general types of effects: (1) effects due to population heterogeneity, which are expected to operate without regard to period (efficiency and labor-control models); (2) period effects, which are expected to operate without regard to differences among firms (institutional hypotheses about changes in federal enforcement efforts); and (3) interaction effects, in which differences among firms become important only in certain periods (institutional hypotheses about federal contracting, location in California, and the influence of the professions). In an event-history framework, the appropriate specification is an exponential piecewise model in the form:
In this equation, r is the rate of transition between states j and k-in our case, the adoption of grievance procedures or EAW clauses-and the subscript p refers to one of three periods. Efficiency and labor-control hypotheses are represented by the term cqjg, in which x is a vector of variables and @ 1s a vector of coefficients. While the values of the variables in x vary across firms and over time, their effects (in @) are assumed not to vary across periods. The term Ojkpzp represents neoinstitutional hypotheses: z, is a vector of causal variables and OF is a vector of coefficients for each period, including a constant. The direct effects of federal policy are represented by the constants in 0,6 and z represents organizational attributes as they are observed within time periods.
Because there is a constant term in q kand three period-specific constants in Ojkp, the equation cannot be identified. We estimate models in this form by constraining the constant for [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] to equal 0. Note: In both models, the constants for the 1955-1972 period are constrained to equal 0; in Model 2, the constant for the 1980-1985 period is constrained to equal 0. *p < .05 * *p < .O1 ***p < ,001 (one-tailed tests)
RESULTS
fects. The coefficients for firm size and percent technical, professional, and managerial Two models of the adoption of grievance employees are positive and significant, while procedures are reported in Table 1 . Model 1 the coefficient for unionization is negative includes all hypothesized effects; Model 2 and significant. Four of the seven variables omits nonsignificant effects. Some efficiency in this group show no significant effect: wage and labor-control variables show strong ef-growth, capital intensity, formation of ILMs,
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and change in the percentage female in the labor force have no association with the diffusion of grievance procedures.
Hypotheses generated by neoinstitutional theory also fare well. As we predicted, adoption rates were significantly higher (net bf measured covariates) in the 1973-1980 period than before or after. In Model l the constant term for 1955-1972 is constrained to equal 0, which means that the baseline adoption rate for that ~e r i o d is the same as the time-independent constant. The constant for 1973-1 980 is positive and significant, while the constant for 1981-1985 is not significant, indicating that during the Reagan Presidency federal influence on the adoption of grievance procedures dropped to its pre-1973 level. Substantive measures of the legal environment also show interesting results. The coefficients for federal contracting only partially conform to the hypothesis: The estimated effect is positive, but is significant only in the 1981-1985 period. California firms created grievance procedures more rapidly than others in the sample, but only after 1980; this fits our expectations exactly. Results concerning the role of the professions contain some surprises. The coefficient for the personnel office variable is positive and significant in the first period,-suggesting strong early support for grievance procedures, but for the second period the coefficient is significant and negative, and for the third period it is effectively 0. The effect of labor-attorneys is as anticipated: Firms that retained a labor attorney were significantly more likely to create grievance procedures only in the middle period of relatively strong EEO enforcement.
Model 2 omits nonsignificant substantive variables and constrains the constant term for 198 1-1985 to eaual zero. Elimination of noise from the equation changes the coefficients little. Standard errors are smaller than in Model 1 for all variables; the period constant for 1973-1980 drops in magnitude by about one-third but remains strong and significant; and post-1980 coefficients for federal contracting and location in California increase a bit. Likelihood-ratio tests show that there is no significant loss of fit in Model 2 relative to Model 1. Table 2 shows results from models for the publication of EAW clauses. Despite the small number of significant coefficients (3 of 22), the chi-square statistic shows that Model 1 achieves a significant fit to the data. Efficiency and labor-control variables show no significant effects, and as expected there are no significant institutional effects prior to 1973. There are no direct effects of federal EEO enforcement: The constant term for the 1973-1980 period is positive as hypothesized but not significant, and the constant for the 1981-1985 period is effectively 0. This seems rather peculiar because, as the hazard plot in Figure 1 shows, diffusion rates for EAW clauses began to accelerate in the mid-1970s and continued to accelerate throughout the early years of the Reagan Administration, despite the decline in federal EEO pressure.
Further results shed light on how this occurred. First, Model 2 shows that the constant term for 1973-1980 becomes significant when we drop the other nonsignificant variables from the equation, supporting our argument that employers perceived the legal environment as riskier during this period. Second, in the 1973-1980 period, firms with personnel offices were no more likely than other firms to publish EAW clauses, but after 1980 the effect of having a personnel office is impressive. Also as predicted, EAW clauses spread rapidly to firms in California, but only after 1980 when the legal environment in that state became more hostile. As expected, links to labor attorneys had no effect. These findings suggest that the diffusion of EAW clauses occurred in two phases. In the initial phase (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , they diffused among all sorts of firms, probably in response to the general uncertainty created by EEOJAA law. Diffusion accelerated in the second phase (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , but the increase was concentrated in firms that faced the greatest apparent risk (those in California), and firms with direct links to agents of diffusion (those with personnel offices).
We summarize by noting similarities and differences in these two sets of models. The major similarities are that, for both innovations, adoption rates rose across the board during the 1970s, and rose particularly in California during the early 1980s. This lends strong support to our fundamental argument that legalization in for-profit firms is driven by legal uncertainty: As the source of uncer- 
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show distinctly different roles played by the human relations professions. Personnel offices may have helped to popularize grievance procedures early on, but results suggest that from 1973 to 1980 they discouraged the adoption of grievance procedures. We are not sure how seriously to take this result because we find no other evidence that personnel professionals actively opposed grievance procedures. Clearly though, as the level of legal uncertainty rose in the mid-1970s, labor attorneys replaced personnel administrators as the chief agents in the diffusion of grievance procedures. By contrast, personnel offices appear to have played an increasingly important role in the diffusion of EAW clauses, and labor attorneys had no impact.
DISCUSSION
We draw three broad inferences from our findings. First, while previous research has treated legalization as a unitary and highly normative phenomenon, the diffusion of grievance procedures and employment-atwill clauses suggests the emergence of two modes of legality in U.S. firms. Both are defensive responses to shifts in federal and state policies, but they imply different perspectives on governance. One, exemplified by grievance procedures, is inclusionary and rights-generating; the other, exemplified by employment-at-will clauses, is exclusionary and rights-limiting. This contrast is sharpened by the observation that none of the public agencies in our larger sample reported publishing EAW clauses, and previous research has shown that public agencies have adopted grievance procedures for their nonunion employees much faster than have private firms. Thus, these two modes of legality, and the exclusive and inclusive management regimes they symbolize, are defined in part by the reach of the state. But we do not want to overdraw this distinction. As we have pointed out, these two policies are not mutually exclusive in our sample; in fact they are statistically independent. We are not surprised that some firms implemented progressive and regressive governance policies simultaneously, because firms can hardly be expected to make sharply discriminant responses to a legal environment that is shifting and ambiguous. Our major point is that the menu of legitimate responses has changed over the last 20 years: Despite their procedural and political differences, both grievance procedures and EAW clauses define the employment relationship in legal terms. Second, our results lend some new support to efficiency and labor-control theories of legalization: Large firms, firms that draw on more professionalized labor markets, and nonunion firms all established grievance procedures for their exempt employees at higher-than-average rates. The failure of earlier studies to detect effects of this sort is probably a result of the fact that they aggregated nonprofit and public-sector employers together with for-profit firms, thus obscuring any causal influences that might be unique to the latter. Our results suggest that employers in the for-profit sector adopt grievance procedures strategically to protect valuable employee assets and to forestall unionization. EAW clauses, by contrast, diffused without regard to firm size, development of ILMs, unionization, or labor-market characteristics.
Our third and most important inference concerns the interactive influence of the state and the professions. Government provided the original impetus for both forms of legalization. Initiatives by all three branches of the federal government circa 1972 declared an effective federal interest in equal employment opportunity, invalidated the traditional rule of at-will employment in the cases of women and minorities, and raised uncertainty about standards of compliance with federal policies and judicial doctrine. When federal EEO enforcement activities declined in the early 1980s, courts in a few states, such as California, challenged at-will employment as applied even to White males. Our modeling strategy, which used time-periods as proxies for different enforcement regimes, undoubtedly oversimplified the fluidity of the process. But the models yielded convincing results: Analyses showed that federal pressure directly accelerated adoption rates of both policies between 1973 and 1980. More important, analyses showed that the boundary-spanning activities of the professions were contingent on shifts in government policy. Our results extend the research of Edelman et al. (1992) AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW by suggesting something like a "succession effect" in the relative roles of personnel experts and labor lawyers. Personnel experts were the first to promote grievance procedures outside the collective bargaining context. Only later, as nonunion grievance procedures became more common and the legal environment became more threatening, did labor lawyers become the main agents of diffusion. In the early 1980s, personnel experts began to sponsor EAW clauses as a preemptive defense against lawsuits, while labor lawyers remained skeptical. Since that time, a few more court decisions have validated EAW clauses as legal disclaimers (see the early cases cited in Baskin 1987:593-94) . If this trend continues, lawyers may take up the cause, perhaps once again becoming more influential than personnel administrators.
In terms of the two innovations studied here, it appears that personnel administrators were "explorers" and labor lawyers were "settlers." Of the two groups, personnel administrators are less committed to legal norms and legal logic, and their marginal position in firms inclines them to embrace unproven compliance recipes. The legal profession is, by nature, conservative and self-referential. Because their jurisdiction over the legal field is secure by definition, labor attorneys have neither the inclination nor the incentive to be as adventurous as personnel administrators in proposing new governance policies. We cannot say whether this pattern can be generalized to other changes in organizational governance. We suspect, however, that our findings are relevant for debates about the role of interest and agency in the construction of the legal environment and the institutionalization of new organization practices. The findings suggest that institutionalization can be conceptualized as a sequential process in which different sets of agents-each of which occupies a different position in the organizational field, has different stakes in the outcome, and controls different kinds of discursive resources-commit themselves to a given practice only at certain stages of the game. In the early stages, when the practice lacks legitimacy, semiprofessions like personnel administration are important sponsors because they act opportunistically and are relatively unconstrained by professional orthodoxy. More thorough institutionalization, signified by the achievement of takenfor-granted legitimacy, seems to require the sponsorship of mature professions like the law. The "settlers' " role is to theorize Dractices as integral parts of the organizational field in which they are the dominant actors.
Finally, our analysis contravenes conventional views of the U.S. state as weak and incapable of ordering the "private" behavior of firms and citizens. As recently as 20 years ago, U.S. employers took for granted their unfettered authority to discharie employees and saw no need to state it explicitly. Today that authority is contested, and is thus more often articulated in formal legal terms. The legalization of managerial authority has been encouraged by the state, but not in a straightforward way. While the federal government seldom mandates the use of specific organizational practices-unlike, for example, the more statist regulatory regimes of France and Germany-it has nonetheless developed a formidable regulatory apparatus that generates models of organizational compliance through an iterative process. Legislation and court decisions establish broad guidelines for behavior, and professional agents advise firms on the design of practical compliance strategies that are in turn reviewed by courts and administrative agencies. Once approved, these strategies are interpreted as recipes for compliance by other organizations and subsequent policy makers (Abzug and Mezias 1993; Carruthers and Halliday 1994; Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman 1992) . Thus, the compliance recipes devised by U.S. firms become powerful institutional models, just as do the solutions that are directly mandated by "strong" states (Meyer and Scott 1983) . This iterative process has contributed to the evolving undkrstanding of the nature of workplace discrimination, and to the search for possible remedies (Burstein 1990 ). The emergent conception of employee rights and the construction of legalistic models of governance are products of that search, but we are reluctant to predict how far this process will go. Political support for individual rights is precarious, and as we have shown, legalization has both an inclusionary and an exclusionary face. Thus the future of legality in the workplace is uncertain.
